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Abstract
We use a Massachusetts merit aid program to provide the ﬁrst clear causal evidence on
the impact of college quality on students’ postsecondary enrollment decisions and rates of
degree completion, where college quality is deﬁned by a variety of measures including on-time
graduationrates. Highschoolstudentswithtestscoresabovemultiplethresholdsweregranted
tuitionwaiversatin-statepubliccollegesoflowerqualitythantheaveragealternativeavailable
to such students. A binding score regression discontinuity design comparing students just
above and below these thresholds yields two main ﬁndings. First, students are remarkably
willing to forego college quality for relatively small amounts of money. Second, choosing a
lower quality college signiﬁcantly lowers on-time completion rates, a result driven by high-
skilled students who would otherwise have attended higher quality colleges. For the marginal
student, enrolling at an in-state public college lowered the probability of graduating on time
by more than 40%. The low completion rates of scholarship users imply the program had
little impact on the in-state production of college degrees. More broadly, these results suggest
that the critically important task of improving college quality requires steps beyond merely
changing the composition of the student body.
For making the data available for this project, we are indebted to Carrie Conaway, Director of Planning, Research,
and Evaluation, and Robert Lee, MCAS Chief Analyst, at the Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education, as well as Jon Fullerton, Executive Director of the Center for Education Policy Research at Harvard Univer-
sity. We also thank for helpful comments Ed Glaeser, Jeff Liebman, Dick Murnane and Johannes Schmieder. Institu-
tional support from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government and Taubman Center for State and Local Government
are gratefully acknowledged. Any errors are our own.
yCorresponding author.1 Introduction
RecentresearchhasemphasizedtroublingtrendsinU.S.collegecompletionratesoverthepastfew
decades (Belley and Lochner 2007, Bailey and Dynarski 2011). Among students entering college,
completionratesarelowertodaythantheywereinthe1970s, drivenlargelybythelowcompletion
rates of men and students from lower socioeconomic backgrounds. The factors driving these
low completion rates are a matter of current debate. Poor academic preparation of high school
students is thought to play some role, given that college enrollment has expanded to larger and
larger portions of the high school population, but that alone does not seem sufﬁcient to explain
low completion rates. Controlling for rich sets of student characteristics does not eliminate wide
variation among postsecondary institutions in completion rates (Bowen et al. 2009).
Much more of the completion rate puzzle is explained by the changing characteristics of col-
leges themselves, particularly the resources available at such institutions. Bound and Turner
(2007) show that large cohorts within states have relatively low college completion rates, which
likely stems from decreased resources per student in those cohorts given states’ tendencies to
change public postsecondary budgets slowly. Bound et al. (2010) argue that the vast majority of
the decline in completion rates can be statistically explained by decreasing resources per student
within institutions and, even more importantly, shifts in enrollment toward the relatively poorly
funded public sector. Much of the literature on the impact of college quality on degree completion
focuses on the community college sector, reaching conﬂicting conclusions about whether access
to and quality of community colleges affects educational attainment (Rouse 1995, Leigh and Gill
2003, Sandy et al. 2006, Calcagno et al. 2008, Stange 2009, Reynolds 2012).
The central challenge of estimating the impact of college quality on college completion is the
non-random selection of students into institutions of different apparent quality. The aforemen-
tioned research attempts to eliminate such selection bias by either by conditioning on observable
characteristics of students or by instrumenting college quality with distance from or tuition of
nearby colleges. Neither of these approaches is entirely satisfactory and leave open the strong pos-
sibility that unobserved student-level characteristics may be driving the conﬂicting results such
research reports. Similar problems confound estimates of the impact of college quality on labor
1market earnings, many of which are positive (Loury and Garman 1995, Brewer et al. 1999, Cheva-
lier and Conlon 2003, Black and Smith 2004, Black and Smith 2006, Long 2008, Hoekstra 2009),
some of which are zero (Dale and Krueger 2002, Dale and Krueger 2011), and some of which sug-
gest that that earnings differences dissipate once the job market properly understands graduates’
underlying ability (Brand and Halaby 2006, Lang and Siniver 2011).
Of all the research on college quality of which we are aware, only Hoekstra (2009) uses an
identiﬁcation strategy that convincingly eliminates selection bias. There, the author identiﬁes the
impact of attending a ﬂagship state university on earnings by exploiting an admissions cutoff rule
that allows for a fuzzy regression discontinuity design. Unfortunately, he only observes the enroll-
ment decisions of those admitted by this rule and can only guess at the counterfactual enrollment
decisions driving the observed differences in earnings. It is thus quite rare to ﬁnd a plausibly ex-
ogenous variation in college quality for a given student. We have, however, found such a source of
variation in college quality in a setting where we observe the enrollment decisions of all students.
The policy we exploit is a Massachusetts merit aid program in which high school students with
test scores above multiple thresholds were granted tuition waivers at in-state public colleges of
lower quality than the average alternative available to such students. The scholarship value was
high enough to induce substantial variation in college choice but low enough that the induced
shift in college quality was vastly more important than the money itself.
We use this program to provide the ﬁrst clear causal evidence on the impact of college quality
on students’ postsecondary enrollment decisions and rates of degree completion, where college
quality is deﬁned by a variety of measures including on-time graduation rates. A binding score
regression discontinuity design comparing students just above and below these thresholds yields
two main ﬁndings. First, students are remarkably willing to forego college quality for relatively
small amounts of money. Second, choosing a lower quality college signiﬁcantly lowers on-time
completion rates, a result driven by high-skilled students who would otherwise have attended
higher quality colleges. For the marginal student, enrolling at an in-state public college lowered
the probability of graduating on time by more than 40%. The low completion rates of scholar-
ship users imply that the program had little impact on the in-state production of college degrees.
2More broadly, these results suggest that the critically important task of improving college quality
requires steps beyond merely changing the composition of the student body.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we describe the merit scholarship pro-
gram in detail. In section 3, we describe the data and the characteristics of the students under
consideration. In section 4, we explain our empirical strategy, a regression discontinuity design
that accounts for the multiple thresholds students must cross in order to be eligible for aid. In
section 5, we present estimates of the impact of college quality on enrollment decisions and com-
pletion rates. In section 6, we discuss the implications of our results for the state of Massachusetts.
In section 7, we conclude by discussing implications postsecondary policy more generally.
2 The Adams Scholarship
All Massachusetts public high school 10th graders take the Massachusetts Comprehensive As-
sessment System (MCAS), which includes an English language arts portion and a mathematics
portion. Scores on each portion range in multiples of two from 200 to 280, with 260-280 catego-
rized as “advanced” and 240-258 as “proﬁcient”. In January 2004, Massachusetts Governor Mitt
Romney proposed the John and Abigail Adams Scholarship Program, which would waive tuition
at in-state public colleges for any student whose total MCAS score placed him or her in the top
25% of students statewide.1 Romney’s primary goals were to keep highly talented students in
state and improve the quality of the state’s public postsecondary institutions. In his January 15,
2004 State of the State speech to the Massachusetts legislature, Governor Romney explained that
“I want our best and brightest to stay right here in Massachusetts.”2
Concerned that Governor Romney’s statewide standard would assign scholarships largely to
1The eponymous couple cared deeply about education. John Adams wrote, in the Massachusetts Constitution,
that “Wisdom, and knowledge, as well as virtue... as these depend on spreading the opportunities and advantages
of education in the various parts of the country, and among the different orders of the people, it shall be the duty of
legislatures and magistrates, in all future periods of this commonwealth, to cherish the interests of literature and the
sciences, and all seminaries of them; especially the university at Cambridge, public schools and grammar schools in
the towns” (Chapter V, Section II). Abigail Adams, disturbed by the 18th century gender gap, wrote that “It is really
mortifying, sir, when a woman possessed of a common share of understanding considers the difference of education
between the male and female sex, even in those families where education is attended to” (Letter to John Thaxter,
February 15, 1778).
2See the January 20, 2004 Boston Globe article, “Specialists Blast Romney Proposal for Free Tuition,” by Jenna Rus-
sell.
3students in wealthy, high-performing school districts, the state Board of Higher Education ulti-
mately approved a modiﬁed version of the program in October 2004, nine months after the origi-
nal proposal.3 Under the approved policy, a student receives a tuition waiver if his or her MCAS
scores fulﬁll three criteria. First, he or she must score advanced on one portion of the exam. Sec-
ond, he or she must score at least proﬁcient on the other portion of the exam. Third, the student’s
total MCAS score must fall in the top 25% of scores in his or her school district.4 The scores used
to determine eligibility come from each student’s ﬁrst attempt at taking the grade 10 MCAS tests
in ELA and mathematics. To receive the scholarship, a student must be enrolled in and graduate
from a Massachusetts public high school in his or her senior year. The graduating class of 2005
was the ﬁrst to receive the scholarships according to these eligibility criteria and the program has
continued in this form to the present day.
Figure 1 provides a graphical interpretation of scholarship eligibility in a typical medium-
performing school district. About half of the graduates attend such districts (those with cutoff
scores between 502 and 518), where the cutoff score interacts with the proﬁcient/advanced thresh-
old in a complex way. Students must pass the proﬁcient/advanced threshold represented by the
thick solid line and must also achieve their own district’s cutoff score, represented by the thick
dashed line. Scholarship winners are those students whose test scores fall in the shaded region.
In low-performing districts (with cutoff scores of 500 or lower), the cutoff is so low that passing
the proﬁcient/advanced threshold is sufﬁcient to win a scholarship, whereas in high-performing
districts (with cutoff scores of 520 or higher), the cutoff is so high that passing it alone is sufﬁcient
to win. These complexities will inform construction of the eligibility variable to be used in the re-
gression discontinuity estimates. We also note that MCAS scores have risen since the inception of
the program, as shown in Figure 2. Each year a higher fraction of high school graduates qualiﬁes
for the Adams Scholarship, with the district cutoff more often becoming the relevant eligibility
threshold.
Scholarship winners are automatically notiﬁed in the fall of their senior year, eliminating the
3See the October 20, 2004 Boston Globe article, “New MCAS Scholarship OK’d,” by Jenna Russell.
4As of the class of 2006, students in charter schools or who participate in school choice or the Metco program can
fulﬁll the third criterion by placing in the top 25% of the district they attend or the district in which they reside.
4selection bias that confounds evaluations of aid programs requiring applications. The scholarship
waives tuition at any of ﬁfteen (two-year) community colleges, nine (four-year) state colleges, or
four University of Massachusetts (U. Mass.) campuses.5 Receipt of the scholarship does not, how-
ever, eliminate the cost of college attendance. Figure 3 shows the tuition and fees at the University
of Massachusetts at Amherst and Bridgewater State College, the two largest campuses in their
respective sectors. Strikingly, at both campuses and nearly all other public Massachusetts col-
leges, tuition has remained constant in nominal terms over the past decade. Mandatory fees have,
however, risen dramatically.6 The letter that Governor Romney sent to the ﬁrst class of scholar-
ship recipients promised in bold-faced and underlined letters “four years of free tuition.” Perhaps
due to confusion this engendered in students and families unaware of the distinction between tu-
ition and the overall cost of attendance, more recent letters to recipients have emphasized that the
scholarship “covers tuition only, and does not include college fees.”7
Thus, for the ﬁrst class of Adams scholars in fall 2005, the tuition waiver was annually worth
$1,714 if used at U. Mass. Amherst or $910 if used at Bridgewater State. Given mandatory fees
of $7,566 at U. Mass. Amherst and $4,596 at Bridgewater State, the Adams Scholarship thus re-
spectively represented a 17-18% reduction in the direct cost of attendance. By the fall of 2010,
fees had risen by roughly a third, so that the Adams Scholarship represented only a 13-15% re-
duction in the cost of attendance. These percentages would be substantially lower if room, board
and other expenses were added to the cost of attendance. The Adams Scholarship thus lowers the
cost of college attendance by well under 20%, is worth at most $6,856 (4*$1,714) over four years,
and is about one half the value of a Georgia HOPE award and one sixth the value of a CalGrant
award (Dynarski, 2008; Kane, 2003). By all of these measures, the Adams Scholarship represents a
relatively small amount of ﬁnancial aid.
Finally, those eligible for the scholarship can use it only if they graduate from a Massachusetts
public high school, are accepted at a Massachusetts public college or university, and enroll at that
5Six of Massachusetts’ state colleges (Salem, Bridgewater, Fitchburg, Framingham, Westﬁeld and Worcester) were
renamed “state universities” in 2010. For simplicity, we refer to them as “state colleges” throughout the paper.
6This peculiar detail may be due to the fact that tuitions are set by the Massachusetts Board of Higher Education
and ﬂow directly to the state’s General Fund, while fees are set by each college’s Board of Trustees and are retained by
the colleges themselves.
7See Figures A.1 and A.2 for copies of these letters.
5institution full-time. The student must also complete the Free Application for Federal Student
Aid (FAFSA) and send the Adams Scholarship award letter to the ﬁnancial aid or bursars ofﬁce at
the institution he or she plans to attend.8 To continue receiving the Adams Scholarship, a student
must continue his or her full-time enrollment at a Massachusetts public college or university, must
maintain a cumulative college GPA of at least 3.0, and must complete the FAFSA annually, for up
to 8 semesters of college.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education (DESE) provided the
data, which include demographic information, test scores and Adams Scholarship status for all
Massachusetts public high school students expected to graduate from high school from 2005-
2010. Speciﬁcally, information on student program participation, poverty status, gender, and
race/ethnicity comes from the Student Information Management System (SIMS), which we link to
ﬁrst time 10th grade test scores as reported in the MCAS database. DESE separately provided us
with a list of Adams Scholarship winners, which we merge into this larger data set. We limit our
sample to high school graduates from the classes of 2005-2007, as only graduates were eligible for
the Adams scholarship.9 For all three classes we can observe college enrollment and completion
within four years of high school graduation. We also examine more recent classes but can only
observe college enrollment, and not completion, for such students.
College outcomes come from DESE’s merge of its data on high school graduates with the
National Student Clearinghouse (NSC) database, which covers 94% of undergraduates in Mas-
sachusetts.10 We observe for each high school graduate every college enrollment spell through
2011, including the speciﬁc college attended, dates of attendance, and college location and type.
8Scholarship users must also be a U.S. citizen or permanent resident of the U.S. and must have been a permanent
legal resident of Massachusetts for at least one year prior to entering college as a freshman.
998.3% of those who receive the Adams scholarship letter in the fall of 12th grade ultimately graduate from high
school. Regression discontinuity analysis, as described further below, suggests that receipt of this letter had no impact
on high school graduation rates. This sample restriction therefore does not create selection bias.
10The remaining 6% come largely from for-proﬁt institutions and those whose highest degrees take less than two
years to complete. Such institutions tend to enroll students with relatively low academic skill, so that the overall match
rate for those eligible for the Adams Scholarship is likely substantially higher than 94%.
6We also observe graduation if it occurs. We merge on additional college characteristics such as
college costs and quality measures from the U.S. Department of Education’s Integrated Postsec-
ondary Education Data System (IPEDS) and the 2009 Barron’s rankings of colleges. We separate
colleges into Adams eligible institutions (U. Mass. campuses, state colleges and community col-
leges), private in-state institutions, and out-of-state institutions. For each student and type of
college, we construct two primary outcome indicators, one for enrolling full-time by the fall fol-
lowing high school graduation and one for earning a college degree within four years of high
school graduation.
Table 1 shows the mean characteristics of high school graduates from the classes of 2005-2007.
Column (1) contains the full sample of students. Columns (2) and (3) split the sample by Adams
Scholarship eligibility. Column (4) restricts the sample to those who use the Adams Scholarship
by attending a public college within Massachusetts. Column (5) restricts the sample to students
sufﬁciently close to the eligibility threshold to be used in our subsequent regression discontinuity
analysis, as will be described below. Comparing columns (2) and (3) reveals that Adams eligible
students are less likely than Adams ineligible students to be low income, black or Hispanic, or
enrolled in special education, because these characteristics are negatively associated with the test
scores determining eligibility. Column (2) also reveals that 82% of Adams eligible students enroll
in college full-time by the fall following their high school graduation. Of these, 30% enroll in-state
at public colleges, 22% enroll in-state at private colleges, and 31% enroll out of state. More than
half of the in-state public enrollment occurs at U. Mass. campuses. Comparing columns (2) and
(4) shows that those who use the Adams Scholarship are more likely to be low income and have
slightly lower test scores than the average Adams eligible student.
Perhaps the most striking fact in this table is the large gap between college enrollment rates in
panel C and graduation rates in panel D. In the full sample, only 30% of students graduate within
four years, relative to the 63% who enroll, a completion rate of 48% (.30/.63). This completion
rate is higher among higher-scoring Adams eligible students, at 63% (.52/.82), but lower among
those who use the Adams Scholarship, at 41% (.41/1.00). This suggests that Massachusetts’ public
colleges have low four-year completion rates relative to other colleges available to Massachusetts’
7students.
Figure 4 conﬁrms this by plotting by college type the fraction of students graduating within a
certain number of years. The sample is limited to four-year college enrollers from the high school
class of 2004, prior to the existence of the Adams Scholarship. Panel A shows that only 44% of
those who graduate from U. Mass. campuses do so in four years. The comparable ﬁgure for Mas-
sachusetts state colleges is 32%. For in-state private colleges and out-of-state colleges, that ﬁgure is
over 60%. Panel B shows these completion rates for the full set of college enrollers, including those
who we do not observe graduating within seven years. Fewer than 20% of students who enroll
at Massachusetts’ public four-year colleges graduate within four years, relative to 30% who enroll
at alternative colleges. In all sectors, over 50% of students fail to complete their degrees within
seven years. This evidence makes clear that, in terms of degree completion time, Massachusetts’
public four-year colleges are clearly inferior to the alternative colleges available to Massachusetts
students.
Table 2 provides a more detailed description of the college market facing Massachusetts stu-
dents, showing quality and cost measures by college type in the fall of 2004, prior to the start of
the Adams Scholarship. Figures are weighted by enrollment of Massachusetts students and thus
represent the average students’ experience of that sector. Panel A reveals that U. Mass. campuses
and state colleges have four-year graduation rates of 36% and 25% respectively, far lower than the
53% rate for in-state private and out-of-state colleges. The SAT scores in each sector suggest that
the academic skill of incoming students may explain part of the difference in completion rates
for state colleges but can not explain it for the U. Mass. campuses, which look quite similar to
in-state private and out-of-state colleges. The latter are more selective, based on admission rates,
so they may be screening students along other dimensions of academic skill. The in-state private
and out-of-state colleges also have better student-faculty ratios (13.6 and 15.1) than U. Mass. cam-
puses and state colleges (17.6 and 17.9). Bound et al. (2010) argue that the student-faculty ratio
may be the best simple measure of resources available to college students because, unlike expen-
diture ﬁgures, it is not inﬂated by rising prices of productive factors such as labor. By this measure,
Massachusetts public four-year colleges are providing about 20% fewer resources to students than
8available private and out-state alternatives. That this resource gap may reduce students’ access to
coursework or to academic support necessary to complete such coursework may help explain the
low completion rates at Massachusetts’ public colleges.
No one of these variables perfectly captures the single dimension referred to as college quality.
Black and Smith (2006) argue that, because each such variable measures college quality with error,
relationships between them and outcomes of interest will be biased toward zero. We adopt their
suggestion to measure college quality by combining information from multiple variables, in order
to reduce such measurement error. Speciﬁcally, we construct “college quality” from our student-
level data as the ﬁrst component from a principal component analysis of each college’s SAT math
75th percentile, admissions rate and student-faculty ratio. We think that the ﬁrst two capture some
element of student quality while the last is a proxy for available resources. We do not include
four-year graduation rates in this measure because this is the outcome we are ultimately trying to
explain.11 We then standardize this quality measure to have mean zero and standard deviation
one. The ﬁnal row of panel A shows that U. Mass. campuses and state colleges are 0.34 and 0.88
standard deviations lower than the average quality college attended by Massachusetts high school
graduates, while in-state private and out-of-state colleges are 0.24 and 0.15 standard deviations
higher in quality. These ﬁgures accord with the measures underlying the quality measure itself.
Panel B may explain why students would choose to attend one of the U. Mass. campuses or
state colleges given these large quality differences. In the fall of 2004, the total annual costs of
enrolling in a U. Mass. campus and state college, including room, board and books, were roughly
$18,000 and $14,000 respectively. Grant aid brought those net prices to under $11,000 and $8,000.
In contrast, the total costs of in-state private and out-of-state colleges were $38,000 and $35,000,
with net prices of $23,000 and $21,000. For students enrolling in four-year colleges, Massachusetts
public institutions were less than half as expensive as the alternatives and thus are quite attractive
to students, particularly those facing ﬁnancial constraints.12
11Black and Smith construct their quality measure using nearly identical variables but also include ﬁrst-year retention
rates. We think this is too close the graduation rate outcome of interest here and thus omit it. This makes little difference
to the quality measure given the high correlations between retention rates and the variables we do include in the quality
measure.
12In-state community colleges, at which the scholarship could also be used, are essentially open admissions cam-
puses. In fall 2004, they charged on average $831 in tuition, $2,073 in fees, and $5,797 in other expenses, so that their
94 Empirical Strategy
We now turn toward estimating the causal impact of the the Adams Scholarship on students’ col-
lege outcomes. Comparing outcomes of those eligible and ineligible for the Adams Scholarship
would confound the impact of the scholarship with the fact that eligible students have higher aca-
demicskillthanineligibleones. Weeliminatethissourceofomittedvariablebiasbyusingaregres-
sion discontinuity design that compares students just above and below the eligibility thresholds.
Students just above and just below these thresholds are similar to each other except for receipt
of the scholarship. Though the scholarship may incentivize students to raise their test scores and
qualify for the aid, there is little scope for manipulation of test scores around eligibility thresholds
for two reasons. First, exams are centrally scored and raw scores transformed into scaled scores
via an algorithm unknown to students, their families or teachers. Second, at the time of test ad-
ministration, the district-level 75th percentile threshold is impossible to gauge accurately. As a
result, the assumptions underlying regression discontinuity design are exceedingly unlikely to be
violated here.
The three eligibility conditions required by the Adams Scholarship complicate the implemen-
tation a regression discontinuity design. Only a few papers in the economics of education have
dealt with such a situation (Papay et al., 2010, 2011a,b). For simplicity, we use a binding-score
regression discontinuity design in which we collapse the three dimensions of eligibility into a sin-
gle measure that that perfectly determines treatment assignment (Reardon and Robinson, 2012).
To do so, we use DESE’s data to determine each school district’s 75th percentile cutoff. We then
deﬁne each student’s distance from the eligibility threshold as the minimum of the following three
quantities: the difference between her total MCAS score and the district’s 75th percentile cutoff,
the difference between her lowest MCAS subject score from the proﬁcient threshold at 240, and
the difference between her highest MCAS subject score from the advanced threshold at 260.
In mathematical terms, we deﬁne the running variable GAPijt for student i in district j and
sticker and net prices were roughly two-thirds those of state colleges.
10high school graduating class t as follows:
GAPijt = min(TOTijt   CUTjt;BESTijt   260;WORSTijt   240) (1)
where TOTijt is student i’s combined math and ELA MCAS scores, CUTjt is the district speciﬁc
cutoff for the top 25% of MCAS scores, BESTijt is the higher score of the student’s two MCAS
subjects, and WORSTijt the lower score of the student’s two MCAS subjects.13 For example, a
student that scores 254 in ELA, scores 272 in math, and resides in a district with a cutoff of 522
will have GAPijt = min(526   522;272   260;254   240) = 4. In her case, the district cutoff is
the forcing variable. In summary, GAPijt assigns to each student her distance from the eligibility
threshold that she was least above. This construction implies that any student with a non-negative
value of GAP is eligible for the Adams Scholarship while any student with a negative value of
GAP is ineligible. GAP can theoretically range in value from -160 for the lowest-scoring students
to 20 for the highest-scoring students. We will thus focus on our analysis on students within 20,
or more frequently 10, points of the threshold.
To estimate the causal effect of the Adams Scholarship, we use the now one-dimensional run-
ning variable to estimate linear probability models of the following form:
Yijt = 0 + 1A + 2GAPijt + 3GAPijt  A + 0
4Xi + t + ijt: (2)
where A is an indicator for Adams Scholarship eligibility (GAPijt  0), t is a high school grad-
uating class ﬁxed effect, and Xi is a vector of the demographic controls listed in panel A of Table
1. The causal effect of winning the Adams Scholarship on an outcome, Yijt, is 1.14 Assuming
13Students can actually qualify for the top 25% criterion based on either 11th grade district of enrollment or 12th
grade district of enrollment. Starting with the class of 2006, students at charter schools or who participate in school
choice or Metco can also become eligible based on their 11th or 12th grade district of residence. We therefore use the
lowest cutoff among each of these thresholds as CUTjt.
14We do not worry about manipulation of the running variable for a number of reasons. First, exams are centrally
graded and neither students nor teachers know how the state will translate raw scores into the scaled scores relevant
for the eligibility calculation. Second, it is impossible for students or teachers to know ahead of time the 75th percentile
cutoff that also enters the eligibility calcluation. Third, as we show in Table A.1, there is little evidence of discontinuities
in observable characteristics of students across the threshold. The only signiﬁcant difference, in low income rates, is
practically quite small. We control for such characteristics in our main speciﬁcations but show in Table 7 that such
controls have no impact on our central results.
11that treatment effects are homogeneous along different parts of the eligibility threshold, this co-
efﬁcient measures a local average treatment effect for students near the threshold, weighted by
the probability of a given student being near the threshold itself. Our baseline regression spec-
iﬁcation limits the sample to students students within 10 scaled MCAS points of the eligibility
threshold (i.e. jGAPj  10). We later show that our results are robust to choice of bandwidth and
demographic controls.
As a preview of our regression results, we plot in Figure 5 four-year college outcomes by dis-
tance to the eligibility threshold as measured by GAP. We include the high school classes of
2005-2007 for whom we can observe college graduation within four years. Panel A plots the frac-
tion of students enrolling in four-year college in the fall following their high school graduation.
A clear discontinuity at the eligibility threshold in the bottom series suggests the Adams Scholar-
ship incentivized a substantial fraction of students to enroll in in-state four-year public colleges.
A similar though somewhat smaller discontinuity in the middle series suggests that the scholar-
ship succeeded in keeping students in-state for initial college enrollment. The lack of a clearly
visible discontinuity in the top series suggests that the scholarship did little to increase overall
enrollment, implying that students choosing Massachusetts public colleges would simply have
attended another college in the absence of the scholarship. Panel B, which plots the fraction of
students graduating within four years from four-year institutions, shows much smaller disconti-
nuities in the bottom two series, suggesting that relatively little of the induced college enrollment
in-state at public institutions translated into on-time completion of degrees. Most striking is that
the top series appears to contain a discontinuity in the opposite direction, suggesting that students
barelyeligiblefortheAdamsScholarshipwerelesslikelytograduateanycollegewithinfouryears
than those barely ineligible. We now turn to regression analysis to measure these ﬁndings more
rigorously.
125 Results
5.1 Enrollment and Completion
Panel A of Table 3 shows the coefﬁcient on the Adams eligible indicator, 1, for enrollment by
the fall following high school graduation. This panel includes high school classes from 2005-
2007, for whom we also observe graduation outcomes.15 All outcomes are restricted to four-year
colleges, exception of the two-year college outcome in column (8). The scholarship induced 8.3%
of students near the threshold to attend in-state four-year public institutions. The vast majority
of these students enrolled at a U. Mass. campus, with the remaining students enrolling in less
selective four-year state colleges.16 Columns (4) and (5) reveal that 2.2% (one fourth) of these
students would have attended in-state four-year private colleges while 5.1% (more than one half)
would have attended out-of-state colleges. Columns (6) and (7) reveal that the scholarship thus
raised in-state enrollment by 6.1 percentage points but had no statistically signiﬁcant impact on
overall enrollment rates at four-year colleges.17 To summarize, receipt of the Adams Scholarship
induces a substantial number of students to choose in-state public four-year colleges over private
and out-of-state alternatives, and attracts a small number of students into the two-year sector who
would not otherwise have enrolled in college at all.18 Overall, the scholarship does keep students
instatewhowouldotherwisehaveleft, butalsoshiftssomestudentsfromin-stateprivatecolleges.
There is no impact on four-year college enrollment. These effects are in line with those found in
Goodman (2008), which used a coarser outcome measure to explore these questions.
We now turn to the impact of the scholarship on four-year college graduation rates in panel
B. Each regression in this panel uses as an outcome an indicator for graduation from that col-
lege sector within four years of high school graduation. Column (1) is striking. Of the 8.3% of
15We later examine more recent high school graduating classes in Table 8.
16Table A.2 shows a breakdown of these results by individual college campus. U. Mass. Amherst alone is responsible
for over one-third of the overall enrollment effects.
17Column (8) does show, however, that the scholarship increased by 1.4 percentage points the fraction of students
enrolling in two-year colleges, nearly all of which are in-state community colleges. Panel B shows that none of this
additional enrollment translated into increase completion rates, even within four years. Subsequent tables will focus
solely on four-year colleges outcomes.
18We also examined enrollment within two years of high school graduation and found no substantive differences in
enrollment effects. Students who react to the scholarship seem to do so immediately, not within two years after high
school graduation.
13students induced by the scholarship to enroll at in-state four-year public colleges, only 2.2% grad-
uate within four years, a ratio of 27%. Within the U. Mass. sector that ratio is an even lower,
with only 1.2% of students graduating even though 6.0% were induced to enroll. This ratio of
22% is less than half that of the average U. Mass. student at the eligibility threshold, who has a
47% (0.069/0.146) chance of graduating within four years. This suggests that the marginal student
induced to switch to a U. Mass. campus by the Adams Scholarship is much less likely to graduate
on time than the average student with similar test scores who chooses a U. Mass. campus.
One possible explanation for the low completion rate from Massachusetts public colleges is
that students may transfer to other institutions. Panel C explores this by deﬁning as outcomes
indicators for enrolling in a given college sector but failing to graduate from any college within
four years. In all columns the coefﬁcient in panel C is almost exactly the difference between the co-
efﬁcients in panels A and B, suggesting that transfers to other college sectors are not an important
part of this story.
The fact that U. Mass. campuses and other in-state public colleges have such low on-time
completion rates implies two further facts about the policy’s effects. First, as seen in column (6),
though the scholarship successfully increased the fraction of students enrolling in-state for college
by a substantial 6.1 percentage points, it increased the fraction of students completing college in-
state and within four years by only 1.1 percentage points. Raising local college completion rates is
more difﬁcult than raising local college enrollment rates. An evaluation of this program based on
short-run effects would judge it much more favorably than a longer-run evaluation, pointing the
importance of follow-up studies that look beyond immediate effects of such programs.
The second and more striking fact, seen in column (7), is that scholarship eligibility lowered
the fraction of students completing four-year colleges on time by 2.2 percentage points. Given that
this regression discontinuity estimate compares students of similar academic skill, we can rule out
differences in such skill as an explanation for differences in completion rates. The only explanation
must be that the choice of college itself affected completion rates. In fact, this estimated negative
effect likely understates the true impact of college choice, given that the value of the Adams Schol-
arship itself should have mitigated ﬁnancial constraints that may be responsible for some fraction
14of the failure to graduate on time. The offer of aid should have left students strictly better, or at
least no worse, off. Instead, by inducing them to switch into lower quality Massachusetts public
colleges, the scholarship hurt their longer-run outcomes.
5.2 Quality and Cost
The most plausible explanation for the negative impacts on on-time graduation is that the schol-
arship induced students to trade off college quality for a relatively small tuition subsidy. Table
4 explores the precise quality and cost tradeoffs that the Adams Scholarship induces. In the ﬁrst
three columns, we categorize colleges by the competitiveness category Barron’s assigned them to
in 2009. None of Massachusetts’ public colleges fall into Barron’s three highest categories of “most
competitive,” “highly competitive,” and “very competitive,” which includes private institutions
such as Boston University, Tufts University, Simmons College, and Lesley University. All of the U.
Mass. campuses and nearly all of the state colleges fall into the fourth category of “competitive.”
Private universities in this category are Suffolk University and Wentworth Institute of Technol-
ogy. The ﬁfth category of “not competitive” includes a couple of state colleges and all community
colleges. Columns (1)-(3) reveal that scholarship eligibility induced 2.9% of students to forego
colleges in the highest two categories of most and highly competitive. A further 1.3% chose to
forego very competitive colleges as a result of the scholarship. These result was to increase the
fraction of students choosing competitive colleges, the second lowest Barron’s category and the
one containing nearly all Massachusetts public four-year colleges. Students did not simply switch
into the public sector from private or out-of-state colleges of similar quality. More than half of
the students induced to switch colleges would have enrolled in more selective alternatives in the
absence of the scholarship.
Other measures of college quality point to a similar pattern. For students enrolling in four-year
colleges, scholarship eligibility lowered the four-year graduation rate of their chosen colleges by
2.6 percentage points, an unsurprising ﬁnding given the previously documented differences in
graduation rates between Massachusetts public colleges and other sectors. Columns (5)-(7) simi-
larly show that switching into Massachusetts’ public colleges lowered college quality as measured
15by SAT scores, selectivity and student-faculty ratio. The result in column (8), combining all three
measures as previously described, is that scholarship eligibility lowered college quality by 0.09
standard deviations.
Panel B of Table 4 assigns to each student the cost and ﬁnancial aid for the average student at
a given college as computed by IPEDS, again limiting the sample to those enrolled at four-year
colleges.19 TheAdamsScholarshipinducesstudentstoattendfour-yearcollegeswith$2,200lower
tuition and fees, $1,100 less in grant aid, but identical loan availability. These ﬁgures suggest that
those eligible for the scholarship have annual net costs roughly $1,300 lower than the ineligible.
This is not unexpected given how much less expensive Massachusetts’ public four-year colleges
are than the available alternatives, as we saw in Table 2.
Finally, we note that column (7) of panel B shows eligibility implied a $479 discontinuity in the
average annual value of the tuition waiver. This discontinuity combines the discontinuity in en-
rollment for marginal students with the discontinuity in aid eligiblity for infra-marginal students.
In column (8) we estimate the discontinuity just for marginal students by assigning hypothetical
Adams aid even to students below the eligibility threshold. This suggests that one-fourth of the
scholarship funds, or $123 out of $479, ﬂowed to marginal students. Combined with column (8)
from panel A, this implies a willingness to forego 0.75 (0.092/123) standard deviations of college
quality per $1,000 in annual aid, a remarkably high number. Students are surprisingly willing to
forego college quality for relatively small amounts of ﬁnancial aid.
5.3 The Impact of College Quality on Completion
The previous analysis has convincingly shown that scholarship eligibility both induced students
toforegocollegequalityandloweredtheiron-timecollegecompletionrates. InTable5, wedirectly
estimate the impact of college quality on students’ on-time completion rates, using scholarship
eligibility as an instrument for different measures of college quality in each column. Formally, we
19In-state and out-of-state costs and aid are chosen appropriately when possible.
16are estimating a system of equations of the following form:
Qijt = 0 + 1A + 2GAPijt + 3GAPijt  A + 0
4Xi + t + ijt: (3)
Yijt = 0 + 1 ^ Qijt + 2GAPijt + 3GAPijt  A + 0
4Xi + t + ijt: (4)
where A is an indicator for Adams Scholarship eligibility (GAPijt  0) as before, but here we
use it as a instrument, t and t are high school graduating class ﬁxed effects, and Xi is a vector
of the demographic controls listed in panel A of Table 1. In Equation 3, the ﬁrst stage, we are
estimating a measure of school quality, Qijt, such as enrollment at an in-state public university or
the student-faculty ratio. In Equation 4, the second stage, we use on-time graduation from a four-
year institution as the outcome, Yijt. The causal effect of interest, 1, is interpreted as the effect on
probability of graduation within four years for the marginal student induced to an institution with
quality Qijt. The ﬁrst row of Table 5 replicates estimates seen in previous tables of the impact of
scholarship eligibility on the given measure of college quality, which are the ﬁrst stage estimates.
The second row replicates the impact of scholarship eligibility on the probability of four-year
graduation from panel B of Table 3, with columns (3)-(7) limiting the sample to students enrolling
in four-year colleges, which are the reduced form results from an equation similar to Equation 3
with Qijt replaced by Yijt. The third row contains the instrumental variables estimates themselves,
the ratios of the reduced form estimates to the ﬁrst stage estimates. The ﬁnal row shows the OLS
estimate of the same relationship without using the instrument.
The magnitudes of the IV estimates are striking. For the marginal student induced by the
scholarship to attend in-state public college, attending such a college lowered the probability of
graduating on time by a remarkable 26 percentage points, or more than 40%.20 For the marginal
student induced to forego a most or highly competitive college, attending such a college would
have raised the probability of graduating on time by 75 percentage points. The coefﬁcient in col-
20According to Table 3, 30% (0.102+0.194) of students just below the scholarship cutoff graduate on time from private
and out-of-state colleges, compared to the 46.0% (0.163+0.297) who enroll. If the marginal students would also have
completed at this 64% rate if they had attended such colleges, then a 26 percentage point drop is equivalent to a 40%
decrease in completion rates. More likely, these marginal students would have had lower completion rates even had
they attended such colleges, so that the percentage impact is likely even larger.
17umn (3) implies that, for these marginal students, attending a college with a four-year graduation
rate one percentage point higher would translate into a 1.3 percentage point increase in the prob-
ability of graduating on time. Differences in college-level graduation rates translate slightly more
than one-for-one into individual-level graduation rates for this subset of students.
Columns (4)-(6) yield similar results with different scales. Attending a college with one point
higher SAT scores raises the probability of graduating on time by slightly less than one percentage
point. Attending a college with a one percent lower admissions rate raises the probability of
graduating on time by more than two percentage points. Attending a college with one less student
per faculty member raises the probability of graduating on time by 11 percentage points. Or,
combining these three measures, attending a college of one standard deviation higher quality
raises the probability of graduating on time by 37 percentage points. This is roughly three times
larger than the effect estimated in Long (2008) by OLS and by instrumenting college quality by the
average quality of nearby colleges.21
All of these IV estimates are substantially larger than their OLS counterparts, suggesting either
that omitted variable bias is driving the latter toward zero or that the marginal student induced to
switch college due to scholarship eligibility is more sensitive to college quality than the average
student. We should also note that these estimates actually confound a change in college quality
with the availability of additional ﬁnancial aid. Given that the latter should make students more
likely to complete college on time, we believe these coefﬁcients are actually slight underestimates
of the impact of a change only in college quality.
In Table 6, we take advantage of a unique feature of this policy design to provide further
evidence that a reduction in college quality is responsible for students’ decreased four-year com-
pletion rates. In typical applications, regression discontinuity estimates measure local average
treatment for effects for students near the treatment threshold. In particular, this treatment thresh-
old is generally a ﬁxed number along a single dimension, such as age 65 for Medicare eligibility.
Even in recent applications with multiple thresholds, the authors can at best measure LATEs along
two different dimensions, such English and math thresholds. Our setting is the ﬁrst regression dis-
21See the ﬁrst row of Table 6 in that paper.
18continuity design of which we are aware that allows for measurement of multiple LATEs along
a single dimension. Because part of scholarship eligibility is determined by school district-level
75th percentile cutoffs, the total MCAS score determining one component of the eligibility thresh-
old varies by district. In other words, students at the threshold in low-scoring districts have lower
test scores than students at the threshold in high-scoring districts. The result is that, unlike any
regression discontinuity paper we have previously seen, we can measure treatment effects at mul-
tiple points in the distribution of overall academic skill.
To do so, we split the sample in the following way. For each graduating high school class,
we divide students into two groups by the median 11th grade district-level cutoff score. Table 6
shows the results of this analysis.22 We label students in the lower half of districts as “low skill”
and students in the top half as “’high skill.” In panel A, the ﬁrst few columns show that both sets
of students react strongly to the scholarship by increasing enrollment at in-state public colleges.
Low-skilled students’ enrollment in U. Mass. campuses reacts twice as strongly as that of high-
skilled students. This is partly due to the fact that the scholarship raises the four-year college
enrollment rate by 3.3 percentage points for low-skilled students, though it has no such effect on
high-skilled students.
Columns (6)-(8) make clear that only the high-skilled students are foregoing higher quality
colleges. As a result of scholarship eligibility, high-skilled students are 3.4 percentage points less
likely to enroll in most or highly competitive colleges, attend college with graduation rates 2.3 per-
centage points lower, and forego 0.1 standard deviations of college quality. Low-skilled students
do not forego any college quality as a result of the scholarship. This parallels closely the estimates
in column (5) of panel B, which show that scholarship eligibility decreases the on-time graduation
rates only of high-skilled students and not of low-skilled students. The overall decrease in on-time
graduation previously estimated is driven entirely by high-skilled students.
This heterogeneity analysis provides further evidence that college quality is the key channel
through which graduation rates are affected. High-skilled students who would otherwise have
22Because of the extraordinarily high correlation between district-level income and test scores, the results that follow
are nearly unchanged if we instead divide students by district-level poverty rates. For this reason, we omit separate
analysis by income.
19gone to higher quality colleges are induced to enroll in the lower quality U. Mass. campuses
and state colleges. The result is no impact on overall enrollment rates but a decrease in on-time
graduation rates due to the decrease in college quality. Low-skilled students would, in the absence
of the scholarship, have enrolled in colleges of similar quality to Massachusetts public colleges or
in no college at all. The scholarship does not induce a loss of college quality for them and thus has
no impact on their on-time graduation rates.
5.4 Robustness
We explore the robustness of our main enrollment and completion results to alternative speci-
ﬁcations in Table 7. Panel A is our preferred speciﬁcation that we have been using throughout
the paper, which employs a bandwidth of jGAPj  10, ﬁts linear functions on either side of
the threshold, and includes students’ demographic controls. Panel B uses the same speciﬁca-
tion but excludes demographic controls. Panel C replicates panel A but reduces the bandwidth
to jGAPj  6. Panel D replicates panel A but expands the bandwidth to jGAPj  20 and ﬁts
quadratic functions on either side of the threshold. Finally, to account for the few cases in which
our assignment rule does not match DESE’s assignment rule, Panel E replicates panel A with a
fuzzy regression discontinuity in which we instrument ofﬁcial Adams eligibility with our des-
ignation of Adams eligibility.23 Because our algorithm closely follows DESE’s procedure, there
is little difference between our designation of Adams eligibility and ofﬁcial Adams notiﬁcation,
with a ﬁrst stage coefﬁcient of 0.98 (t=303). Across the panels, all ﬁve models show nearly identi-
cal results, suggesting that our central estimates are robust to inclusion of demographic controls,
choice of bandwidth, choice of functional form, and measurement error in the eligibility variable.
We also show, in table 8, that our results are not driven by one particular class of students. This
is a concern given the possibility that the decrease in on-time completion rates is driven by the ﬁrst
eligible class’ misunderstanding of the scholarship letter’s promise of “four years of free tuition.”
If such students did not know the fee structure of the public colleges, they may have miscalcu-
lated the ﬁnancial burden attendance would imply, thus interfering with their ability to complete
23The few discrepancies likely arise from the fact that DESE’s data sets are updated occasionally and that we are
working with the most recent version, not the version in existence when Adams eligibility was originally determined.
20college on time. If that were the case, we would expect enrollment and completion impacts to
diminish over time as subsequent classes learned from prior classes’ mistakes. Table 8, which es-
timates these enrollment and graduation impacts separately by high school class, suggests this is
not the case. The estimated impacts of scholarship eligibility on enrollment and graduation are
relatively similar across the ﬁrst three classes. The negative impact of the scholarship on four-year
graduation rates is actually highest for the class of 2007, suggesting that the above misinformation
story is not driving our main results. Also interesting is the fact that the scholarship’s impact on
in-state public enrollment was notably smaller in 2008 and 2010 than in earlier years. This could
relate to deteriorating macroeconomic conditions in those years or to the fact that the scholarship’s
value diminished over time relative to rising fees.
Finally, Table 9 shows that considering ﬁve- and six-year graduation rates leaves the main
conclusions of this paper intact. Panel A shows the classes of 2005 and 2006, for whom we can
observe four- and ﬁve-year graduation rates. Panel B shows just the class of 2005, for whom
we can observe four-, ﬁve- and six-year graduation rates. Column (1) reveals that the impact of
the scholarship is higher on ﬁve-year graduation rates than it is on four-year rates, suggesting
that some fraction of marginal students do take a ﬁfth year to graduate. There is little difference,
however, between impacts on ﬁve- and six-year rates. Columns (5) and (6) show that estimated
impacts of the scholarship on graduation rates are negative even when students are given an extra
year or two to complete their degrees. Overall, these ﬁgures suggest that under one-third of the
negative impact on four-year graduation rates is due to delayed graduation, while the remaining
two-thirds is due to failure to graduate at all (at least within the six year window we observe).
6 Implications for Massachusetts
A cost-beneﬁt analysis of the Adams Scholarship policy is complicated by the fact that the costs
are never listed in budget appropriations. Because the scholarship comes in the form of a tuition
waiver, the costs of the program are determined by the revenue foregone by the state of Mas-
sachusetts when such waivers are granted to enrolled students. We have found no prior calcula-
tion of these costs, but can compute them with our data by multiplying the number of scholarship
21eligible students at each campus with the tuition at that campus, as in Table A.3. We limit the
calculations to students within their ﬁrst four years of college, given the scholarship’s restrictions.
Our calculations suggest that, once the scholarship was ﬁnancing a full four classes of students
a year, the annual cost to the state was on the order of $25 million. To date, the state has spent
upwards of $100 million on the program.24
These expenditures have led to an eight percentage point increases in enrollment in Mas-
sachusetts’ four-year public colleges, as hoped for by Governor Romney and other proponents
of the policy. Such enrollment increases have not, however, translated into substantial increases
in in-state production of college degrees. Our estimates suggest at most a two percentage point
increase in in-state graduation rates, suggesting that three quarters of the induced enrollment did
not translate into in-state completion. This gap is due in small part to the scholarship’s shifting
of students from in-state private colleges but in larger part to the fact that students induced into
Massachusetts public colleges do not ﬁnish college at all.
If we assume that two percentage point estimate applies to the entire distribution of student
eligible for the scholarship, or about 15,000 students per year, then the scholarship is producing
roughly 300 more four-year college graduates in Massachusetts per year for $25,000,000.25 This
translates to a cost per additional in-state graduate of over $80,000. One reason for this high
number is that, according to our estimates in Table 3, about three-fourths of Adams Scholarship
users are infra-marginal, meaning that they would have attended in-state public colleges even
without the scholarship. Similarly, according to Table 4, three-fourths of the scholarship funds
ﬂow to students whose college choices are unaffected by those funds. This calculation also likely
underestimates the true cost per in-state graduate given that some fraction of these students will
leave Massachusetts soon after graduating from college. A full cost-beneﬁt analysis would also
account for the two percent of, or roughly 300, students who failed to complete a college degree
24These numbers may be slight overestimates given that some enrolled college students may violate conditions nec-
essary for continued receipt of the scholarship, such as maintaining a minimum cumulative GPA of 3.0 or completing
the FAFSA annually. Interestingly, our estimates are remarkably close to Governor Romney’s estimates at the time that
the program would “cost $6.3 million its ﬁrst year and about $25 million a year when fully up and running.” See the
October 20, 2004 Boston Globe article, “New MCAS Scholarship OK’d,” by Jenna Russell.
25The assumption of similarity between the average treatment effect across all scholarship eligible students and the
local average treatment effect for the marginal student is based on the results of Table 6, which in column (4) of panel B
suggest little difference by skill in the impact of scholarship on in-state completion rates.
22as a result of the scholarship. All in all, these considerations suggest the state is spending large
amounts of money for relatively little net beneﬁt or even net harm to its students.
7 Conclusion
We draw three broad conclusions from our ﬁndings. First, our estimates suggest that students
have a poor understanding of the importance of college quality, particularly as measured by
on-time graduation rates. According to calculations based on the American Community Sur-
vey (ACS) in Massachusetts, the lifetime earnings difference between those holding only B.A.s
and those with only some college is about $970,000. Students induced to attend in-state pub-
lic colleges by the Adams Scholarship lower their chance of graduating by 26 percentage points,
thus incurring an expected lifetime earnings penalty of $250,000. Alternatively, Black and Smith
(2006) estimate that a one standard deviation decrease in college quality is associated with a 4.2%
decrease in earnings, or about $100,000 for Massachusetts B.A. holders with average lifetime earn-
ings of $2.5 million.26 Students induced to attend in-state public colleges by the Adams Schol-
arship lower their college quality by 1.1 standard deviations, thus incurring an expected lifetime
earnings penalty of $110,000.27 The earnings penalty, whether computed from reduced college
completion or lower college quality, far outweighs the value of the tuition waiver, which at most
can be worth about $7,000 for students attending the most expensive U. Mass. campuses for a
full four years. It is possible that some students were so myopic or ﬁnancially constrained that
switching into scholarship eligible institutions was a rational decision. More likely, the marginal
student did not understand that foregoing college quality would lower her own chance of earning
a college degree.
Second, this poor understanding of the importance of college quality and on-time graduation
rates suggests a possible scope for policy interventions to make certain information about colleges
bothmorereadilyavailableandmoresalient. Students, parentsandhighschoolsshouldtakemore
26We assume the 4.2% decrease in earnings, calculated on a sample of men, holds for women as well.
27Scholarship eligibility raises in-state public attendance by 8.3 percentage points and lowers college quality by 0.092
standard deviations. This implies that in-state public enrollment lowers college quality by 0.092/0.083 = 1.1 standard
deviations.
23advantage of tools like the U.S. Department of Education’s “College Navigator”, which allows
students to compare characteristics such as completion rates across institutions. Simultaneously,
such tools, which often present users with hundreds of statistics about a given college, should
privilege variables that users are known to underweight. On-time graduation rates are one such
variable.
Third and ﬁnally, the harm done to students by exposure to colleges with relatively little fund-
ing and low graduation rates highlights the critical importance of improving such institutions.
Governor Romney attempted to improve Massachusetts’ public colleges by changing the com-
position of the student body. The evidence here suggests that approach did not succeed. Stu-
dents exposed to those colleges because of the Adams Scholarship had worse long-run outcomes
than those not exposed. Whether college quality operates through access to coursework, cam-
pus resources, peer effects, or other channels is beyond the scope of this paper. These results do,
however, suggest that improving college quality requires steps beyond merely changing the com-
position of the student body. Deeper exploration of the factors preventing on-time completion is
needed, particularly for postsecondary systems with such obvious challenges.
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27Figure 2: MCAS Scores by High School Class
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28Figure 3: Tuition and Fees at Two Typical Massachusetts Public Colleges
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29Figure 4: Time to Graduation by College Type, Class of 2004
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30Figure 5: On-Time Enrollment and Graduation Within Four Years at Four-Year Colleges
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31Table 1: Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Adams Adams Adams RD
sample eligible ineligible users sample
(A) Demographics
Female 0.51 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.52
Black 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.04 0.04
Hispanic 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.04
Asian 0.05 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.06
Other race 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Low income 0.18 0.09 0.20 0.13 0.11
Limited English proﬁcient 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
Special education 0.12 0.01 0.16 0.01 0.02
(B) Adams Scholarship
Math scaled score 246.39 265.46 239.84 263.44 260.61
ELA scaled score 246.70 262.56 241.25 259.85 257.35
Total scaled score 493.09 528.02 481.09 523.29 517.96
Adams eligible 0.26 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.56
(C) On-time enrollment
In state, public 0.30 0.30 0.30 1.00 0.32
In state, U. Mass. 0.10 0.18 0.07 0.61 0.17
In state, state coll. 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.27 0.10
In state, comm. coll. 0.12 0.04 0.14 0.12 0.06
In state, private 0.14 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.18
Out of state 0.20 0.31 0.16 0.00 0.28
Any college 0.63 0.82 0.57 1.00 0.78
(D) Graduate in 4 years
In state, public 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.39 0.13
In state, U. Mass. 0.04 0.08 0.03 0.26 0.07
In state, state coll. 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.04
In state, comm. coll. 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02
In state, private 0.08 0.16 0.05 0.01 0.12
Out of state 0.13 0.23 0.09 0.01 0.19
Any college 0.30 0.52 0.23 0.41 0.44
N 170,894 43,807 127,087 12,959 61,032
Notes: Mean values of each variable are shown by sample. Column (1) is the full sample of high school graduates
from the classes of 2005-2007. Columns (2) and (3) split the sample by Adams Scholarship eligibility. Column (4)
restricts the sample to those who use the Adams Scholarship. Column (5) restricts the sample to students close
enough to the threshold to participate in regresssion discontinuity analysis.
32Table 2: Four-Year College Quality and Costs (Fall 2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4))
In state, In state, In state, Out of
U. Mass. state coll. private state
(A) Quality
On-time graduation rate 0.35 0.25 0.44 0.46
SAT math 75th percentile 612 550 576 597
Percent admitted 0.69 0.75 0.68 0.68
Students per faculty 17.56 17.80 14.29 16.20
College quality -0.33 -0.89 -0.23 -0.25
(B) Costs
Tuition 1,598 948 21,645 19,769
Required fees 7,099 4,535 426 966
Additional expenses 8,336 8,142 10,516 9,533
Total cost 18,042 14,261 35,150 32,647
Grant aid 7,487 6,607 12,672 11,771
Net price 4,582 3,575 4,739 5,068
Loans 10,556 7,654 22,477 20,876
Notes: Mean values of each variable are shown for the ﬁrst college of students with on-time college enrollment, by
category. College cost and characteristic data from IPEDS. Dollars are in nominal terms.
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Figure A.1: Award Letter to Class of 2005
 
 
            MITT ROMNEY 
                  GOVERNOR 
 
  
   
           KERRY HEALEY 
      LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR 
 
 
 
 
 
December 9, 2004 
 
 
 
Dear [Name to be mail-merged]: 
 
Congratulations! You are one of the first recipients of the John and Abigail Adams Scholarship.  The 
Adams scholarship is good for four years of free tuition at any University of Massachusetts campus, or 
any state or community college.  Your outstanding MCAS results automatically qualify you to receive this 
award.   
 
We created this merit scholarship program to reward your hard work and achievement, and to encourage 
you to go to college at one of our top-notch public higher education institutions.   
 
With the support of the Board of Higher Education, the Class of 2005 is now the first to be awarded this 
opportunity.  It is the strongest expression we can make of our commitment to attracting students like you- 
the best and brightest in the state- to our Commonwealth’s public higher education system.   
 
I encourage you to apply to any of the campuses on the attached list.  Congratulations again, and best 
wishes for your continued success. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
  
 
Mitt Romney 
               
	 ﾠ
THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 
STATE HOUSE     l     BOSTON, MA  02133 
              (617) 725-4000 
41Figure A.2: Award Letter to Class of 2012
Massachusetts Executive Office of Education 
 
One Ashburton Place, Room 1403, Boston, Massachusetts 02108                 Telephone: (617) 979-8340 
PAUL REVILLE 
Secretary of Education 
 
 
October 2011 
 
Dear <Student Name>: 
 
Congratulations! 
 
You have qualified to receive a John and Abigail Adams Scholarship, which entitles you to four years 
of free tuition upon your acceptance to a participating Massachusetts public institution of higher 
education, including a University of Massachusetts campus, a Massachusetts state university, or a 
community college. 
 
Now in its eighth year, the Adams Scholarship rewards high academic achievement on MCAS tests, 
and provides families of college-bound students with financial assistance. Please note that the Adams 
Scholarship covers tuition only, and does not include college fees. 
 
Please review the enclosed guidelines carefully to determine whether you meet the eligibility 
requirements. If you do, I encourage you to apply to one of the campuses on the attached list.  
 
It is extremely important that you make a copy of this letter and keep the letter and copy in a safe 
place. In order to receive the scholarship, you must submit this letter to the financial aid office of 
the Massachusetts public college or university to which you have been accepted and complete the 
online Free Application for Federal Student Aid (FASFA).   
 
Congratulations again, and best wishes for your continued success in college and beyond. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
   
Paul Reville      Mitchell D. Chester, Ed.D.      Dr. Richard Freeland  
Secretary of Education  Commissioner of Elementary and    Commissioner of  
        Secondary Education        Higher Education 
 
 
Name  <Student Name> 
Birth Date  <DOB> 
SASID  <SASID> 
School Name  <School Name> 
School Code  <D/S Code> 
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